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Abstract 
 
This paper obtains an evolving pattern of goods market integration in Russia, considering the 
period of economic upturn, since the second half of 2000 through the end of 2007. In an 
integrated market, the price of a tradable good at any location is determined by the national 
market, not local demand. Based on this, the strength of dependence of local prices on local 
demands is used to detect and measure market segmentation. The costs of a staples basket across 
almost all Russian regions with a monthly frequency are used as the empirical stuff. The pattern 
obtained suggests that in the time span under consideration the degree of Russia’s goods market 
integration was relatively stable, fluctuating around some level; no sufficient improvements or 
deteriorations were detected. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
A spatially dispersed market for a tradable good can be deemed as integrated if there are no 
impediments to trade in the good between locations. In other words, transaction costs are the 
same for an inter-location deal and within-location deal. On the other hand, the same conditions 
are needed for the law of one price to hold: given the absence of impediments to trade, the good 
is sold for the same price in all locations. This implies that the price of the good at any location is 
determined by the national market, not local demand. Hence, local prices should not depend on 
local demands in the integrated market. If such a dependence does take place, the market is not 
integrated, and the strength of the dependence can measure the degree of market segmentation. 
(Or, conversely, the degree of market integration: the weaker the dependence, the better the 
integration.) Assuming income per capita is the only determinant of demand apart from price, the 
quantity demanded in a location can be replaced by local income per capita. To be realistic, the 
spatial separation of locations has to be allowed as an irremovable impediment to trade, 
“cleaning” local prices from transportation costs. 
Based of these theoretical considerations, the evolution of Russia’s market integration 
during June 2000 through December 2007 is estimated, taking Russian regions as locations (80 
of all the 83 regions are covered). The costs of a staples basket across regions with a monthly 
frequency are used as the empirical stuff; transportation costs are proxied by distances between 
capital cities of regions. In addition to Russia as a whole, the estimations are run over two more 
spatial samples. The first is Russia excluding 6 regions with difficult access (i.e., remote regions 
having poor communication with the rest part of the country, mostly lacking railway 
communication with it). The second sample is European Russia, that is, regions of the European 
part of the country except for its northern territories.   
The results obtained suggest that the degree of integration of the Russian market in 2001-
2007 is rather stable, fluctuating around some stable level. These fluctuations can be assigned for 
the most part to random shocks and sometimes to seasonal phenomena. It can be believed that 
the degree of integration in 2001-2007 is roughly the same that was reached by 1999-2000. In 
contrast to previous findings, no sufficient difference is found between integration in Russia 
excluding difficult-to-access regions and European Russia. The pattern obtained gives grounds to 
surmise that levels of integration in 2001-2007 are those of practically achievable degrees of 
integration in Russia at present time. 
 
   3
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Two fundamentally different stages can be distinguished in the economic development of 
contemporary Russia. Since the beginning of 1990s, economic recession took place in the 
country. Following some time after the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia it changed to 
upturn. The issue of goods market integration in Russia in the first stage was of great interest for 
economists. Berkowitz, DeJong and Husted (1998), Berkowitz and DeJong (1999, 2001, 2003), 
de Masi and Koen (1996), Gardner and Brooks (1994), Goodwin, Grennes, and McCurdy 
(1999), and Koen and Phillips (1992, 1993) analyzed this issue, using different product and 
location samples as well as time spans and exploiting various methodologies. Their findings can 
be summarized as follows. In the early years of transition, segmentation of the Russian goods 
markets increased, whereupon, about the middle of 1990s, a turn for the improvement of 
integration started. Such a pattern is the most pronounced in Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) and 
Gluschenko (2003), who estimated integration trajectories, i.e. time series of a degree of 
integration. From the latter paper, one can believe that by 1999 or 2000 the integration of the 
Russian goods market reached some practically achievable maximal degree, and so, it would be 
more or less stable from that time on. Unfortunately, no paper on market integration in Russia in 
the stage of economic upturn has appeared, and so, it is still a question whether such a belief is true.   
This paper fills the gap, analyzing the evolution of market integration in the country in 
2001-2007. It uses a methodology put forward in Gluschenko (2003, 2004) that is based on the 
following idea. The market is deemed integrated if the law of one price holds in it, controlling 
for transportation costs. Hence, in an integrated market, the price of a tradable good at any 
location is determined by the national market, and not by local demand. Otherwise the strength 
of dependence of local price on local demand measures market segmentation (or, conversely, 
integration: the smaller the segmentation, the higher the integration). To make such a 
relationship operational, it is transformed to that between local price and local income per capita. 
Running cross-sectional estimations of the degree of segmentation/integration for each available 
point in time, an integration trajectory is obtained, thus providing the temporal pattern of market 
integration. The cost of a staples basket is used as a goods price index. The data cover almost all 
regions in Russia, and span the period June 2000 up to December 2007 at a monthly frequency. 
In fact, this paper is a sequel to Gluschenko (2003), extending the 1992-2000 integration   4
trajectories obtained in that paper to 2007. Unfortunately, in spite of the same methodology, the 
1992-2000 and 2001-2007 trajectories are not fully comparable because of difference in the 
staples baskets (both in the commodity and location coverage) for these time spans. The data on 
the costs of both baskets overlap in the last seven months of 2000, which allows comparing 
estimates and roughly assessing the effect of difference in the data.  
The results obtained suggest that the degree of integration of the Russian market in 2001-
2007 is, indeed, rather stable, fluctuating around some stable level. These fluctuations can be 
assigned for the most part to random shocks and sometimes to seasonal phenomena. Being 
estimated on a yearly basis, the degrees of integration are close across years. Taking account of 
the difference in the data used for 1992-2000 and 2001-2007, it can be believed that the degree 
of integration in 2001-2007 is roughly the same that was reached by 1999-2000. However, there 
is one significant difference between results in Gluschenko (2003) and this paper. The former 
finds market integration in European Russia excluding its northern territories to be weaker than 
in Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions, while the latter suggests that these parts of the 
country are integrated equally.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes methodology of 
the analysis and the data used. Section 3 presents empirical results for 2000-2007. Section 4 
considers the effect of difference in the staples baskets and confronts integration trajectories for 
1992-2000 and 2001-2007 with each other. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Here is a brief restatement of the methodology used for assessing the degree of market 
integration in Gluschenko (2003, 2004): 
Consider a market for a tradable good consisting of a great number of spatially separated 
sub-markets (regions of the country) {r}. Taking all variables as logarithms, let Pr be the price of 
the good in region r, Ir the per capita income, Qr = D(Pr, Ir) the demand function (assuming Ir is 
the only determinant of demand apart from price), and Qr = S(Pr) the supply function. (Local 
quantities are negligibly small compared to their total across all regions.) Regions are linked by 
arbitrageurs (also supposed to be numerous) so that no monopolistic effects occur, even if the 
good is not produced in some regions. By moving the good to or from the region, arbitrageurs   5
adjust the quantity supplied in it when the local price increases or decreases due to changes in 
local demand (e.g., because of variations in per capita income).  
A market is deemed integrated when such an adjustment leads prices to equalize across 
regions so that the law of one price holds. Perfect integration implies there are no impediments to 
the movement of the good between regions, and the market operates like a single perfectly 
competitive market. Thus, the price of the good at any region is determined by the national 
market, not local demand. From the viewpoint of an individual region, the supply curve S is 
perfectly elastic. The presence of impediments to inter-region trade causes the market to be 
segmented. These impediments are quantified as arbitrage transaction costs Crs needed to move a 
unit of the good between s and r. In the segmented market, prices differ across regions, resulting 
in a dependence of local prices on local demand. 
From the above considerations, it follows that the dependence of local prices on local 
demand could be used to detect and measure market segmentation. However, data on quantities 
demanded are, as a rule, unavailable. Therefore, it is more convenient to derive a relationship 
between prices and incomes as a testable version. Taking a single region r, the equilibrium 
condition in its market 
D(Pr, Ir) – S(Pr) = 0  (1) 
yields Pr = f(Ir). It is important to note that while demand D(Pr, Ir) is a local one, supply S(Pr) is 
not that of local producers only, being formed jointly by producers from all regions through the 
inter-region arbitrage. It is this that makes S(Pr) to be a horizontal line when there are no market 
frictions, or something like a logistic curve in the presence of impediments to arbitrage.  
With some additional assumptions, f(Ir) can be represented as a log-linear function 
Pr = κ + βIr. (2) 
Thus, β = dPr/dIr. As (1) holds for each Ir, the derivative of its left-hand side with respect 
to Ir equals zero. From this we obtain 
dPr/dIr = –εI/(εD – εS), (3) 
where εI is the income elasticity of demand, and εD and εS are the price elasticities of demand 
and supply. It follows from (3) that β ≥ 0. With finite εS, β is positive. However, β = 0 in a 
perfectly integrated market, i.e. β vanishes as supply approaches perfect elasticity (εS → ∞). 
Subtracting (2) for some region s from that for r, an equation in terms of percentage   6
differentials, Prs ≡ Pr – Ps, Irs ≡ Ir – Is, is arrived at (throughout the paper, r and s are arranged so 
that Prs ≥ 0): 
 Prs = βIrs. (4) 
Although (4) is a pairwise comparison, the region pair, r and s, is not dealt with in 
isolation. The rest of regions act “behind the scene,” forming supplies in r and s, and so, 
influencing on the value of β. 
Thus, relationship (4) can be used as a cross-sectional test for market segmentation. A 
positive value of β indicates that regional markets are not perfectly integrated. The magnitude of 
β (the elasticity of price dispersion vis-à-vis income dispersion) can be used as a measure of the 
degree of market segmentation/integration: a higher value for β means weaker integration (or 
higher segmentation). If  β = 0 holds over a set {(r, s)}, implying the law of one price holds, then 
the relevant market can be deemed integrated.  
To control for transportation costs, Trs, the price differentials should be cleaned from them 
(so using a weaker version of the law of one price): Prs – Trs = βIrs or Prs = βIrs + Trs. By 
assuming transportation costs to be log-linear function of distance, Trs = α + γLrs, the following 
equation is arrived at: 
Prs = α + βIrs + γLrs, (5) 
where Lrs is log distance separating regions r and s. Taking into account random shocks, εrs, we 
obtain an econometric version of (5): 
Prs = α + βIrs + γLrs + εrs. (6) 
This regression is estimated over a set of N×(N–1)/2 region pairs; N is the number of regions. 
The subjects of the Russian Federation are taken as regions. An exception is autonomous 
okrugs (districts) that are parts of different subjects of the federation, oblasts or krais, being at 
the same time separate subjects of the federation and possessing equal rights with other ones. 
(The Chukot Autonomous Okrug only is not a part of other administrative-territorial entity.) In 
such a case, only inclusive oblast or krai is present in the spatial sample as a region. In the recent 
years, the autonomous okrugs have been uniting with the inclusive oblasts/krais, ceasing to be 
separate subjects of the Russian Federation. By now, only three autonomous okrugs as parts of 
oblasts/krais (as compared to nine in 2000-2005) remain. The data for inclusive regions cover 
prices and incomes in the autonomous okrugs, therefore the mentioned changes in the   7
administrative and territorial division of Russia during the time span under consideration do not 
affect the data used. (Thus, in fact, the autonomous okrugs, either actual or former, are present in 
the spatial sample, although implicitly.)  
The spatial sample covers almost all regions of the country except for three: the Chechen 
Republic and the Moscow and Leningrad Oblasts. Although price data are available for the 
Chechen Republic, information on incomes there is still lacking. Cities of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg are separate subjects of the Russian Federation (“cities-regions”), and at the same 
time they are the capital cities of the surrounding Moscow and Leningrad Oblast; hence the 
distance between, say, Moscow and the Moscow Oblast is zero. That is why only these “cities-
regions” are present in the sample, while the relevant surrounding oblasts are omitted. The basic 
spatial sample contains 77 regions, generating 2,926 pairwise observations. 
Two more subsamples are exploited. The first is Russia excluding difficult-to-access 
regions. These are the Murmansk Oblast, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Sakhalin Oblast, 
Magadan Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast, and Chukot Autonomous Okrug. They are remote regions 
lacking (except the Murmansk Oblast) railway and highway communication with other regions. 
Therefore, arbitrage cannot be bilateral there, goods being imported only in these regions. 
Obviously, difficult access to a number of regions worsens integration of the national market. 
And so, eliminating such regions is equivalent to controlling for this “natural” impediment to 
integration. This subsample contains 71 regions (2,485 pairwise observations). 
Another subsample represents the European part of Russia excluding its northern 
territories; it is hereafter referred to as simply “European Russia;” there are 52 regions in this 
subsample. Since the transport infrastructure is more developed in this part of the country, and 
distances are shorter, it seems that European Russia have to be more integrated than the 
remainder of the country without difficult-to-access regions. However, the results of Gluschenko 
(2003) suggest that it is not the case, and it is interesting whether the situation changed in 2001-
2007. This subsample provides 1,326 pairwise observations. 
The time sample covers June 2000 to December 2007 with a monthly frequency, 
containing 91 points in time. The period June to December 2000 is exploited also for comparison 
with the previous results. 
The cost of a stapes basket is used as a price representative for the analysis. This basket 
was introduced by the Russian statistical agency, Rosstat (formerly Goskomstat), since June   8
2000; it includes 33 foods. The data on the cost of the staples basket and income per capita by 
region are drawn from monthly statistical bulletins Goskomstat/Rosstat (2000-2007). 
Distances are measured between capital cities of regions in network-transportation 
mileage. The railroad distances are drawn from the Tariff Manual (1965). They are updated and 
supplemented with highway, sea, and river distances for regions lacking railway communication 
with the use of modern geographical atlases. (The distance matrix was compiled by Alexei 
Abramov, Novosibirsk State University.) 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the price data in this paper differ from those used in 
Gluschenko (2003). First, the old basket included 25 foods; coinciding goods have different 
quantities in the baskets of 25 and 33 foods. Appendix 1 provides comparison of these baskets. 
Second, the cost of the old basket was that in only the capital city of a region (while income 
represented the whole region, like in this paper). Unlike this, the cost of the new basket is that 
for the whole region. (In fact, it covers region’s capital city and a few more cities/towns within 
the region, among them necessarily the capital cities of former or current autonomous okrugs, if 
the region contains any. The city/town population proportions are used as weights for 
aggregation.) Lacking data for capital cities of autonomous okrugs, the spatial sample in 
Gluschenko (2003) did not include them. Besides, three more regions are explicitly added to the 
spatial sample in this paper: the Republic of Ingushetia, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, and Chukot 
Autonomous Okrug. While comparing the 1992-2000 and 2001-2007 integration trajectories in 
Section 4, the spatial samples are uniformed by omitting these regions from the 2000-2007 sample. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Let us first take a look at unconditional relationships presented in Figure 1. Prices and incomes 
in the figure are normalized to those for the whole of Russia (the latter are weighted averages over 
all regions) and geometrically averaged over 2000:6 through 2007:12. In real terms, the range of 
prices is 0.85 to 2.97 of the national average (thus, the prices differ across Russian regions up to 3.5-
fold); the range of per capita incomes is 0.29 to 3.41 (i.e., the cross-regional difference of nominal 
incomes amounts to 11.8 times). The distance in Figure 1(b) is a geometric average of distance from 
a given region to all other regions; its span is 1,370 to 11,680 kilometers. It is worth noting that the 
pattern displayed in Figure 1 is rather stable across 2000-2007; the by-year plots are very similar to 
it.   9
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Figure 1. Prices vs. incomes and distances 
Note: Squares denote difficult-to-access-regions.  
 
Figure 1 shows that regional prices are strongly correlated with both incomes and distances. 
The former correlation evidences the presence of market segmentation. The slope of the regression 
line in Figure 1(a) equals 0.324, which implies a 1-percent change in regional income per capita to 
yield about a 0.3 percent change in the regional cost of the staples basket (of course, conditional on 
distances this elasticity would decrease). Three outliers are marked in the figure. These are the 
poorest and richest regions in Russia, the Republic of Ingushetia and Moscow, and the most 
expensive region, the Chukot Autonomous Okrug. These outliers could somehow distort the 
pattern of market integration. Indeed, in the below results, the Republic of Ingushetia decreases the 
overall degree of segmentation, seemingly having no dependence of prices on incomes: while the 
income is minimal there, the cost of the staples basket is on average 5 percent above the Russian 
cost. However, the actual reason of the relative expensiveness is a considerable barrier to trade with 
this region that is due to very high risk. Being a close neighbor of Chechya, Ingushetia is the most 
anxious region of Russia from the viewpoint of terrorism, kidnapping, and hijacking. 
Regarding the dependence of prices on distances, Figure 1(b), it looks almost classically, 
like an illustration to bivariate regression from an econometric textbook. The slope of the 
regression of price on distance equals 0.300. Two outliers are seen in this figure: the Chukot 
Autonomous Okrug, the most remote region in Russia, and Moscow, where prices are high   10
despite its closeness to many regions. In the lower left corner of the price-distance scatter plot, 
the regions of European Russia are concentrated with a rather weak correlation of prices and 
distances. And so, Moscow can further weaken the dependence of prices on distances while 
dealing with this spatial subsample. 
 Turning to the dynamics of market integration, Figure 2 plots the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable, price differential Prs, over the three spatial samples under consideration. 
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Figure 2. Price dispersion over Russian regions 
 
Being one of the summary regression statistics, the indicator plotted characterizes at the 
same time price dispersion in Russia. As all Prs ≥ 0, it is the standard deviation of the absolute 
price differential. Figure 2 suggests that price dispersion during the time span considered is 
rather stable, fluctuating around some levels. In Russia as a whole, this level is about 0.21, and 
the range of deviations from it is roughly ±0.03, or less than 15 percent. In Russia excluding 
difficult-to-access regions, the dispersion equals on average 0.093 with ±0.015 deviations, about 
15-16 percent. In European Russia, price dispersion is 0.075 ± 0.014, that is, the fluctuation 
range is less than 19 percent in either direction. 
Figure 3 presents integration trajectories, estimates of the degree of segmentation, β, in 
regression (6), across monthly points in time of the period under consideration. The regressions 
were run with the use of the White heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. All estimates of β as well   11
as estimates of γ (the coefficient on distance) in Russia as a whole and Russia excluding 
difficult-to-access regions are highly significant, having p-values less than 0.001. As for γ in 
European Russia, of 91 estimates, 31 are significant at the 1-percent level, 4 are significant at the 
5-percent level, 6 are significant at the 10-percent level, and 50 are insignificant, sometimes with 
a negative value. (Estimates of γ are presented graphically in Appendix 2.) 
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Figure 3. Market integration in Russia in 2000-2007 
 
Like the price dispersions, the degree of market integration in 2000-2007 can be deemed as 
more or less stable. However, unlike the dispersion of prices, β is much more volatile. In Russia 
as a whole, it has the mean equaling to 0.159 and changes from 0.107 to 0.205, that is, deviating 
from the baseline by up to 33 percent down and 29 percent up. Taking the country excluding 
difficult-to-access regions, the range of β is 0.050 to 0.114 with the mean equaling 0.084, the 
deviations from the mean mounting to 40 percent down and 36 percent up. The figures for 
European Russia are the following: the range of β is 0.039 to 0.106, the mean is 0.079, and the 
maximal deviations from the mean are –51 percent and 34 percent. 
While market integration in Russia as a whole does not reveal any trend, that in other two 
spatial subsamples evinces a trend to very slow improvement. The linear trend of the integration 
trajectory in Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions has the slope equaling –0.000096 
(significant at the 10-percent level); the slope of the European Russia integration trajectory is       12
–0.000305 (significant at the 0.1-percent level). This implies that the degree of market 
segmentation falls during a year by 1.3 percent of the initial level in the former territory, and by 
4 percent in the latter one. 
Unlike Gluschenko (2003), where European Russia has been found weaker integrated than 
Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions since about 1996, these two territories are integrated 
almost equally. Not infrequently, European Russia is integrated even stronger in 2003-2007. 
However, the difference is minor; the 95-percent confidence intervals of estimates of β over 
these two subsamples strongly overlap. A caveat is that such a result can be due to a distorting 
effect of the Republic of Ingushetia. This issue is considered below, in the end of this section and 
in the next section. 
Regularity is seen in the fluctuations of integration trajectories: as if market integration 
deteriorates dramatically in January of every year. However, this is a seeming phenomenon. In 
Decembers, personal incomes skyrocket in Russia because of yearly bonuses, repayment of wage 
arrears, etc. In Januaries, incomes fall, as a rule to values even smaller than in October and 
November of the previous year. But prices mechanically keep rising, having been pushed by the 
December increase in demand. Moreover, it is “traditionally” the beginning of January when 
regulated prices for services (electricity, other public utilities, outlet rent, etc.) are raised, so 
pushing retail prices further up. This two movements, rise in prices and fall of incomes, are not 
concerted with each other, thus resulting in weakening the dependence of local price on local 
demand. (However, as Figure 3 shows, prices again adjust to local demands as soon as after a 
month or two.) A similar reason caused the decrease of β in the end of 2007. In September of 
that year, a wave of significant rise in prices, both wholesale (producers’ and importers’) and 
retail, for many foods started; this rise was not concerted, again, with local demands. Thus, such 
outliers hardly evidence real changes in market integration; they rather can be deemed as noisy 
deviations from an “actual” integration trajectory.  
Some other local changes in the trajectories can also be believed as noise. The point is that 
food prices in Russia are very mobile over high inflation (across 2001-2007, the cost of the 
staples basket rose by 7.6 to 18.8 percent per year; in 2007, the rise amounted to 22.3 percent). 
Sometimes (or/and in some regions), the prices change faster than demand, which is captured by 
the model as transient strengthening or weakening of the price-income dependence, hence, as a 
change of the degree of market integration.    13
Thus, it makes sense to smooth integration trajectories for somehow eliminating noisy 
deviations. Figure 4 reports integration trajectories smoothed through a moving average β
*
t = 
0.1βt–2 + 0.2βt–1 + 0.4βt + 0.2βt+1 + 0.1βt+2. These trajectories look more reasonable than those in 
Figure 3 from the intuitive viewpoint. Some noise seems to be still present in the trajectories; 
nevertheless, it is obvious that further smoothing would leave the trajectories to be bumpy in the 
space of 2000-2004. This suggests that there were cycles of increase and decrease of market 
integration in those years with oscillation period of circa one year (except for 2003) and 
amplitude equaling roughly 0.05 in Russia as a whole and 0.025 in the rest two subsamples. 
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Figure 4. Smoothed integration trajectories 
 
An alternative way to eliminate random shocks in βs is to estimate them over time 
averages. The upper panel of Table 1 reports estimates of model (6) with the use of yearly 
averages of prices and incomes (for 2000, the averages are over its last 7 months) as well as 
averages over the entire time span, 2000:7-2007:12. Since the relative prices and incomes are 
averaged rather than their absolute values, the averaging over time is reasonable despite high 
inflation. As expected, the by-year pattern also suggests oscillations of the degree of integration 
in 2000-2004. Besides, the yearly estimates capture the price shock in the end of 2007 as a new 
cycle of improvement in integration.  Taking estimates of β over the entire span of 2000-2007 as 
baselines, downward deviations from a baseline are much greater than upward ones: the former   14
are up to about –18 percent, reaching –26 percent in European Russia, while the latter do not 
exceed 10 percent. For the most part, the degree of market segmentation is higher in Russia 
excluding difficult-to-access regions than in European Russia; however, the differences are not 
significant, falling within the 95-percent confidence intervals. A minor difference between the 
2000-2007 estimates over these territories corroborates the impression of almost uniform 
integration in them.   
 
Table 1. Estimation results for time averages 
  Russia as a whole  Excluding difficult-to-access 
regions 
European Russia 
Year 
β    γ    β   γ   β   γ   
p-value 
of γ 
Baseline model (6) 
2000 0.143 (0.006) 0.110 (0.004) 0.077 (0.004) 0.031 (0.002) 0.087 (0.005) 0.0063 (0.0031) 0.043
2001 0.165 (0.006) 0.102 (0.004) 0.096 (0.004) 0.032 (0.002) 0.098 (0.005) 0.0063 (0.0029) 0.029
2002 0.186 (0.007) 0.089 (0.004) 0.098 (0.004) 0.021 (0.002) 0.098 (0.006) 0.0027 (0.0030) 0.364
2003 0.155 (0.007) 0.089 (0.004) 0.081 (0.005) 0.021 (0.002) 0.077 (0.007) 0.0034 (0.0036) 0.338
2004 0.181 (0.008) 0.109 (0.004) 0.097 (0.004) 0.042 (0.002) 0.090 (0.006) 0.0081 (0.0028) 0.005
2005 0.157 (0.007) 0.116 (0.004) 0.085 (0.004) 0.045 (0.002) 0.076 (0.005) 0.0064 (0.0026) 0.015
2006 0.162 (0.008) 0.125 (0.004) 0.085 (0.004) 0.048 (0.002) 0.074 (0.005) 0.0090 (0.0030) 0.002
2007 0.170 (0.008) 0.117 (0.004) 0.077 (0.004) 0.042 (0.002) 0.068 (0.005) 0.0120 (0.0027) 0.000
2000-
2007  0.174 (0.007) 0.107 (0.004) 0.093 (0.004) 0.036 (0.002) 0.089 (0.006) 0.0056 (0.0029) 0.050
Model (6) augmented for the difficult access and Ingushetia dummies 
2000 0.104 (0.005) 0.055 (0.003) 0.094 (0.004) 0.033 (0.002) 0.116 (0.004) 0.0054 (0.0023) 0.021
2001 0.123 (0.005) 0.054 (0.003) 0.105 (0.004) 0.033 (0.002) 0.112 (0.004) 0.0067 (0.0024) 0.006
2002 0.149 (0.005) 0.044 (0.003) 0.119 (0.004) 0.023 (0.002) 0.129 (0.004) 0.0021 (0.0022) 0.339
2003 0.138 (0.005) 0.042 (0.003) 0.112 (0.003) 0.022 (0.002) 0.122 (0.004) 0.0014 (0.0022) 0.520
2004 0.154 (0.006) 0.066 (0.003) 0.119 (0.004) 0.044 (0.002) 0.120 (0.004) 0.0076 (0.0022) 0.001
2005 0.125 (0.005) 0.070 (0.003) 0.102 (0.004) 0.047 (0.002) 0.098 (0.004) 0.0058 (0.0021) 0.005
2006 0.130 (0.006) 0.076 (0.003) 0.105 (0.004) 0.050 (0.002) 0.103 (0.004) 0.0086 (0.0023) 0.000
2007 0.125 (0.006) 0.068 (0.003) 0.093 (0.004) 0.044 (0.002) 0.088 (0.004) 0.0126 (0.0024) 0.000
2000-
2007  0.138 (0.005) 0.061 (0.003) 0.114 (0.004) 0.038 (0.002) 0.121 (0.004) 0.0051 (0.0020) 0.014
Notes: β is the coefficient on income differential (the degree of market segmentation), and γ is the coefficient on 
distance; the White heteroskedasticity-consistent errors are in parentheses; except for γ in European 
Russia, all estimates are significant at the 0.1-percent level. 
 
Turning back to Figure 1, much stronger dependence of prices on incomes is seen in 
difficult-to-access regions, particularly, in the Chukot Autonomous Okrug. Because of this 
feature, the overall degree of segmentation of the Russian market is overstated. Another feature 
is the seeming lack of the price-income dependence in the Republic of Ingushetia, which leads to 
understatement of the degree of segmentation. To control for these features, model (6) is augmented   15
for two relevant dummies. The difficult access dummy is constructed as d
(da)
rs = d
(da)
r – d
(da)
s, 
where  d
(da)
r and d
(da)
s = 1 if r or s, correspondingly, is a difficult-to-access region and 0 
otherwise. The Ingushetia dummy is constructed in the same way, so that d
(Ing)
rs = 1 if r is 
Ingushetia,  d
(Ing)
rs = –1 if s is Ingushetia, and d
(Ing)
rs = 0 otherwise. The lower panel of Table 1 
presents the results. The difficult-to-access dummy is present only when estimations are run over 
Russia as a whole; the Ingushetia dummy is used for all the three spatial samples. Estimates of 
dummies are not reported (all they are significant at the 0.1-percent level and have the positive 
sign). One more outlier in Figure 1 is Moscow. Controlling for it with a relevant dummy is not 
reasonable. This would improve the estimates of γ in European Russia, but at the same time 
eliminate the contribution of Moscow to market segmentation. (When the only Moscow dummy 
is added to the baseline model, the estimate of β in European Russia over the entire 2000-2007 
span falls by one third, to 0.051, and the estimate of γ rises almost twice as much, to 0.0106 with 
the 0.1-percent level significance. Regarding the by-year and by-month estimates of γ in 
European Russia, adding the Moscow dummy makes all of them significant.)  
The lower panel of Table 1 suggests that controlling for some regional features decreases 
the degree of market segmentation in Russia as a whole by about one fifth, when the 2000-2007 
span is considered. In 2000, 2001, and 2007, the decrease is even greater, by more than a quarter. 
The elasticity of price difference vis-à-vis distance, γ, becomes almost half, both over the entire 
time span and across years. Controlling for Ingushetia, indeed, increase the degree of market 
segmentation in Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions (by about a quarter) and European 
Russia (by more than a third), while the estimates of γ changes only slightly (although their 
standard errors turn out to be visibly smaller in European Russia). Unlike the baseline model 
estimates, European Russia in 2000-2003 proves to be integrated weaker than in the country 
excluding difficult-to-access regions; their degrees of segmentation become close only since 
2004.  
The qualitative pattern of dynamics remains, nevertheless, almost the same. It contains the 
same cross-year cycles, although with somehow different relative amplitudes. Again, the degree 
of market segmentation is on average constant over 2000-2007, while other two trajectories 
contain weak negative trends, so suggesting very slow improvement in market integration over 
time in these parts of the country.    16
 
4. 1992-2000 vs. 2001-2007 
 
Before combining the integration trajectories for 1992-2000 from Gluschenko (2003) and 
2001-2007 from the previous section and discussing the difference between dynamics of market 
integration in these time spans, let us consider the effect of difference in price data used for 
obtaining these two groups of trajectories. Having got data overlapping for June through 
December 2000, this difference can be analyzed quantitatively. For comparability, all estimates 
with the use of the 33-food basket are run over the same spatial samples as those used when the 
cost of the 25-food basket was exploited. Recall that three regions are lacking in these samples: 
The Republic of Ingushetia, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, and the Chukot Autonomous Okrug. 
(Thus, the 2000-2007 trajectories in Figures 5 and 6 below differ somehow from those in Figure 3.) 
Hereafter, Russia as a whole covers 74 regions (2,701 pairs), Russia excluding difficult-to-access 
regions includes 69 regions (2,346 pairs), and European Russia contains 51 regions (1,275 pairs).  
Table 2 compares means and standard deviations of price differential across the two 
baskets. Both baskets provide almost the same pattern of price dispersion. For the most part, the 
relevant summary statistics are close or even coincide; the maximal difference does not exceed 7 
percent. Thus, from the viewpoint of price dispersion, both baskets can be deemed as equivalent.    
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the dependent variable 
  Russia as a whole  Excluding difficult-
to-access regions 
European Russia 
Period Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Basket of 25 foods 
2000:06  0.150 0.149 0.106 0.086 0.088 0.073 
2000:07  0.161 0.155 0.115 0.090 0.105 0.086 
2000:08  0.172 0.168 0.123 0.096 0.104 0.086 
2000:09  0.162 0.161 0.115 0.096 0.094 0.080 
2000:10  0.161 0.163 0.113 0.098 0.091 0.081 
2000:11  0.161 0.163 0.114 0.098 0.087 0.077 
2000:12  0.161 0.161 0.115 0.099 0.089 0.080 
Basket of 33 foods 
2000:06  0.148 0.151 0.102 0.083 0.085 0.071 
2000:07  0.161 0.156 0.114 0.089 0.108 0.086 
2000:08  0.168 0.162 0.120 0.094 0.099 0.085 
2000:09  0.159 0.156 0.113 0.092 0.090 0.080 
2000:10  0.156 0.154 0.112 0.095 0.086 0.080 
2000:11  0.157 0.154 0.113 0.093 0.084 0.076 
2000:12  0.156 0.151 0.113 0.092 0.085 0.075   17
 
However, that is not the case when the dependence of local prices on local demands is 
dealt with. Table 3 provides comparison of monthly estimates of model (6) as well as estimates 
over the entire span of 2000:6-2000:12 for both staples baskets.  
 
Table 3. Comparison of estimation results for different staples baskets 
  Russia as a whole  Excluding difficult-to-access 
regions 
European Russia 
Period 
β    γ    β   γ   β   γ   
p-value 
of γ 
Basket of 25 foods 
2000:06 0.109 (0.005) 0.081 (0.003) 0.053 (0.004) 0.032 (0.002) 0.094 (0.004) -0.0007 (0.0025) 0.766
2000:07 0.116 (0.005) 0.079 (0.003) 0.064 (0.004) 0.028 (0.002) 0.108 (0.005) 0.0126 (0.0028) 0.000
2000:08 0.113 (0.005) 0.091 (0.003) 0.061 (0.004) 0.035 (0.002) 0.106 (0.005) 0.0078 (0.0029) 0.008
2000:09 0.109 (0.005) 0.091 (0.003) 0.060 (0.004) 0.037 (0.003) 0.098 (0.005) 0.0049 (0.0028) 0.083
2000:10 0.119 (0.005) 0.091 (0.003) 0.064 (0.005) 0.040 (0.003) 0.103 (0.005) 0.0045 (0.0028) 0.105
2000:11 0.110 (0.005) 0.098 (0.003) 0.063 (0.004) 0.047 (0.003) 0.099 (0.004) 0.0022 (0.0026) 0.397
2000:12 0.106 (0.005) 0.094 (0.003) 0.058 (0.004) 0.046 (0.003) 0.103 (0.004) 0.0028 (0.0027) 0.287
2000:06-
2000:12  0.117 (0.005) 0.090 (0.003) 0.064 (0.004) 0.039 (0.002) 0.106 (0.004) 0.0029 (0.0026) 0.426
Basket of 33 foods 
2000:06 0.125 (0.005) 0.083 (0.003) 0.068 (0.004) 0.033 (0.002) 0.104 (0.004) 0.0055 (0.0023) 0.018
2000:07 0.130 (0.005) 0.078 (0.003) 0.076 (0.004) 0.027 (0.002) 0.115 (0.004) 0.0236 (0.0027) 0.000
2000:08 0.147 (0.005) 0.081 (0.003) 0.102 (0.004) 0.028 (0.002) 0.115 (0.005) 0.0070 (0.0028) 0.013
2000:09 0.142 (0.004) 0.080 (0.003) 0.099 (0.004) 0.028 (0.002) 0.110 (0.004) 0.0028 (0.0027) 0.304
2000:10 0.150 (0.004) 0.079 (0.003) 0.104 (0.004) 0.034 (0.002) 0.114 (0.004) 0.0037 (0.0026) 0.153
2000:11 0.138 (0.005) 0.086 (0.003) 0.097 (0.004) 0.038 (0.002) 0.108 (0.004) 0.0034 (0.0024) 0.159
2000:12 0.134 (0.004) 0.082 (0.003) 0.094 (0.004) 0.038 (0.002) 0.106 (0.003) 0.0028 (0.0024) 0.248
2000:06-
2000:12  0.144 (0.004) 0.083 (0.003) 0.096 (0.004) 0.033 (0.002) 0.116 (0.004) 0.0071 (0.0024) 0.003
Notes: β is the coefficient on income differential (the degree of market segmentation), and γ is the coefficient on 
distance; the White heteroskedasticity-consistent errors are in parentheses; except γ in European Russia, 
all estimates are significant at the 0.1-percent level. 
 
When the case in hands is the 33-food basket, the Russian market turns out to be more 
segmented than indicated by estimates based on the 25-food basket. Taking the entire 7-month 
span, β increases by about a quarter in Russia as a whole, and by a half in the country excluding 
difficult-to-access regions. However, the increase is less than 10 percent in European Russia. As 
a rule, the dependence of price differential on distance is slightly weaker for the 33-food basket 
(although the pattern is vague in European Russia; the entire-span estimate of γ suggests that it is 
stronger). Anyway, γs are little affected, for the most part, by the change of the basket. 
The reason of the rise in βs with the new basket seems to be a wider spatial coverage rather   18
than changes in commodity coverage and quantities of goods. Recall that the cost of the old 
basket is that in the capital city of a region, while income is for the entire region. Due to this, the 
dependence of prices on incomes seems weaker than actual. For example, the Tyumen Oblast is 
the second in Russia according to ranking by incomes per capita, while the prices in the city of 
Tyumen are a few percent above the Russian average. But there are northern expensive cities and 
towns in this region that were not taken into account in the price data used for estimating the 
1992-2000 integration trajectories. With the new data, regional prices and incomes become more 
consistent with one another. For the most part, this is strongly valid for the Asian part of Russia 
(Siberia and the Russian Far East), while taking account of additional cities/towns within regions 
has a relatively smaller effect in European Russia, hence smaller difference in estimates of β 
across the baskets. Thus, the estimates of the degree of market integration based of the new price 
data can be believed to be more accurate and reliable. 
The above considerations help to confront integration in 1992-2000 with that in 2001-2007 
despite the lack of sewing of relevant trajectories in the second half of 2000. Figure 5 reports the 
evolution of market integration in Russia from almost the very beginning of price liberalization 
in Russia (occurred in January 1992) till recent time, the 1992-2000 trajectories being drawn 
from Gluschenko (2003). Figure 6 depicts the same trajectories smoothed in the same way like in 
Figure 4.  
In the early years of market reforms in the country, market segmentation rose dramatically. 
Then, beginning about the end of 1994, integration started to improve (this process being broken 
for some time by the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia and preceding events that caused it). 
The improvement came to the end by 1999 in Russia as a whole and excluding difficult-to-access 
regions, and a year after in European Russia, when market integration stabilized at territory-
specific levels. Taking account of the difference between the price data used for obtaining the 
1992-2000 and 2001-2007 integration trajectories, it can be believed that the latter are in fact 
continuations of the former. Be estimated with the use of the same data, corresponding 
trajectories would be sewed together in 2000. Based on this, it can be concluded that market 
integration remained, in general, stable during 2001-2007, keeping the levels reached by the 
beginning of this period. Roughly, these levels correspond to β = 0.15 in Russia as a whole and  
β = 0.1 in Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions and European Russia. (Two appreciable 
deviations of increase of segmentation occurred, however, in 2002 and 2004.)   19
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Figure 5. Market integration in Russia during 1992-2007   20
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Figure 6. Integration in 1992-2007: Smoothed dynamics 
While the integration trajectories for European Russia and the country excluding difficult-
to-access regions diverge in 1992-2000, they are very close to each other in 2001-2007. Weaker 
integration of European Russia could be an artifact caused by insufficient spatial coverage of the 
price index used for 1992-2000. But, on the other hand, Gluschenko (2006), exploiting 
cointegration analysis, finds that it is European Russia where most of regions not integrated with 
the national market and not tending to integration with it are concentrated.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using the cost of the staples basket as the price representative, the temporal pattern of 
market integration in Russia in the years of economic upturn, 2001-2007, has been analyzed. The 
results obtained evidence, in general, roughly stable market integration during the time span 
under consideration. The degrees of integration fluctuate around some stable level due to random 
shocks and, sometimes, seasonal phenomena; only two temporary deviations from such a 
behavior occur. Taking into account that the data used for the 1992-2000 and 2001-2007 
estimations are different, the levels of integration in 2001-2007 can be deemed as roughly the   21
same as reached by 1999-2000. 
  They can be believed to be levels of practically achievable degrees of integration in 
Russia. Taking the degree of integration in the US as the maximal feasible one, Gluschenko and 
Kulighina (2006) estimate β over a sample of US cities (using a basket of 27 groceries) for the 
first quarter of 2000. Two versions of estimations yield the values of 0.047 and 0.055. The value 
of β over Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions for 2000 (both averaged over monthly 
estimates and estimated with the use of yearly averaged data) equals circa 0.06. That is, the 
estimates for the US and Russia proved to be very close. The results of this paper suggest that 
the Russian β has, in fact, the crude value of 0.1. However, this does not cancel a conclusion 
made by Gluschenko and Kulighina (2006). Being corrected to a greater value, the degree of 
market segmentation in Russia (excluding its difficult-to-access regions) still remains, 
nevertheless, comparable to that in the US, having the same order of magnitude. Thus, regarding 
markets of Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions and European Russia, they are not much 
more segmented than the US goods market. 
 
   22
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APPENDIX 1. The staples baskets 
 
Table A1. Composition of the 25- and 33-food baskets 
Sources: Goskomstat (1996), p. 428, and Rosstat (2006), p. 161. 
 
 
Good 
Unit of 
measure 
Quantity,  
the 25-food 
basket 
Quantity,  
the 33-food 
basket 
Bread, white and rye-wheat  kg  5.725  9.583 
White bread  kg  5.242  6.250 
Wheat flour  kg  1.625  1.667 
Rice kg  0.308  0.417 
Millet kg  0.817  0.500 
Peas and beans  kg  —  0.608 
Vermicelli kg  0.433  0.500 
Potatoes kg  10.350  12.500 
White cabbages  kg  2.342  2.917 
Cucumbers kg  —  0.150 
Carrots kg  3.125  2.917 
Onions kg  2.367  1.667 
Apples kg  1.617  1.550 
Sugar kg  1.725  1.667 
Candies kg  —  0.058 
Cookies kg  —  0.058 
Beef kg  0.700  1.250 
Mutton kg  —  0.150 
Pork kg  —  0.333 
Chicken kg  1.458  1.167 
Boiled sausage  kg  0.038  — 
Boiled-and-smoked sausage  kg  0.029  — 
Frozen fish  kg  0.975  1.167 
Salted herring and the like  kg  —  0.058 
Milk litre    10.258  9.167 
Sour cream  kg  0.133  0.150 
Butter kg  0.208  0.150 
Cottage cheese  kg  0.825  0.833 
Cheese kg  0.192  0.208 
Eggs piece  12.617  15 
Margarine kg  0.325  0.500 
Sunflower oil   kg  0.533  0.583 
Salt kg  —  0.304 
Black tea  kg  —  0.042 
Black pepper  kg  —  0.061 
   24
APPENDIX 2. The coefficient on distance 
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Figure A1. Estimates of the coefficient on distance 
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